The influence of the patent system on the economic performance of Western countries during the Industrial Revolution is an important but difficult question to address. With the United Kingdom and the United States, France was one of the first countries to adopt a modern patent legislation in 1791. The aim of this paper is to understand the paradox of such a system, which was based on a democratic and natural-right conception of invention but turned out to be restrictive. It analyses the legal framework and its evolution from 1791 to the late 1850s and reveals its contradictory aspects: a natural right inspiration vs a restrictive access due to the cost of the patent. It shows how the 1844 Patent Act reform did not end the criticism of the French patent system. Then, in a second part, it considers the diffusion of patents in time, in different regions and industries and stresses the heterogeneity of the patent system. 
Introduction
The role of institutions in economic development is a sharply debated issue and the one played by intellectual property is particularly discussed. The time is long gone when Max Weber could claim without real discussion that "without the stimulus of [the] patent law the inventions crucial for the development of capitalism in the field of textile industry in the 18th century would not have been possible".
1 Not only have patents been the subject of recurring controversies throughout their history, but they have also been a source of perplexity for historians and economists alike. Fritz Machlup already stated in 1958 that "if we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it".
2 In a sense, this kind of debate continues today in the light of new work on patent-free innovation in the wake of what Robert Allen put forward in his 1983 seminal paper. 3 The discussion about Great Britain was revived, which Weber had wrongly made the cradle of the first modern patent law. 4 In short, even academically, the role of patent systems in economic history remains a highly controversial subject. 5 In fact, it is quite possible that such a question may not have an unambiguous answer. Despite their similarities, patent laws have strong national particularities that international regulations do not erase. 6 In addition, these systems experienced a number of often exogenous "shocks" that may have had an impact on their implementation. 7 Finally, one of the paradoxes of patent systems is that, for a long time, they have constituted a common base of rules for completely different industries, even if certain special features may have been developed for certain activities. All this requires a fairly precise look at the differ-ent particularities of each patent system before making comparisons and drawing lessons from them too quickly.
France was one of the first major industrialized countries to adopt a legislation on patents in 1791. It played a leading role in the emergence of the first international regulations such as the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (Union de Paris) in 1883. However, its role has been relatively little discussed. In her book The Democratization of Invention (2005), B. Zorina Khan defended a strong point of view about the French and British patent systems.
8 By comparing Great Britain, France and the United States, she suggested that American economic performance was based on a democratization of invention, which was allowed by its own patent system. Contrary to the United States, the "philosophy and enforcement of intellectual property in Britain and in France, the structure of patent and copyright systems, and the resulting patterns of invention, were all consistent with the oligarchic nature of European society". 9 For her, the revolutionary rupture had only a rhetorical meaning. French mercantilist policies remained during the nineteenth century: mistrust toward foreign inventions, strong involvement "in the discretionary promotion of invention" and preference for secrecy remained the essential features of French patterns of invention and conduced to promote rent-seeking activities, which were unfavourable to competitiveness.
Such an assessment seems all the more severe as the French patent laws were long perceived as a natural human right. Thus, from an ideological point of view at least, the French patent system was far from being based on an oligarchic logic. The purpose of this article is to revisit this contradiction in light of new sources and publications. 10 Thanks to new dissertations and to the historical database provided by the French Patent Office (Institut national de la propriété industrielle, INPI), it is possible to carry out a more comprehensive analysis of the French patent system in the first half of the nineteenth century.
In the first section, I describe the legal framework and its evolution from 1791 until the late 1850s. I reveal its contradictory aspects: a natural right inspiration, symbolized by the so-called refusal of any preliminary examination, on the one hand; a restrictive access due to the cost of the patent, on the other hand. I also analyse how the 1844 Patent Act reform did not end the criticism of the French patent system. Then, in a second section, I adopt a quantitative approach by considering the diffusion of patents in time, in different regions and industries and the effects of the 1844 Patent Act.
Inventing the French patent system
Admittedly, many of the problems relating to inventors' rights appeared long before the French Revolution. The royal declaration on privileges for inventors in 1762 expressed a new conception of privileges, which depended on the intense debates about economic regulation at that time. 11 In the 1780s, even though exclusive privileges were the subject of considerable criticism, many agreed that transitional monopolies could be granted to inventors. Inspired by the British example, the French royal administration facilitated the issuance of privileges in inventions, while easing procedures of prior expertise. In return, it required the deposit of the patentee's inventions in order to promote the development of the industrial knowledge. Recognition of the natural right of inventor, issuance of temporary privileges as a reward for inventors and disclosure of inventions were the three features of a model which had appeared at the end of the ancien régime.
The revolution of inventors (1791)
Despite some continuities, the disruptive impact of the Revolution cannot be underestimated. The first revolutionary patent acts resulted from a strong lobbying by inventors' societies. Such organizations had come to light at the end of the ancien régime and in the very first years of the Revolution a new one was created: the Société des inventions et des découvertes which presented a petition to the Assembly in September 1790 in order to obtain the adoption of a French patent law similar to the English one. 12 The representative chevalier Stanislas de Boufflers was then in charge of the petition and presented a report on December 30th 1790. 13 Inspired by Enlightened philosophy, his Rapport sur la propriété des 14 At the same time, Boufflers also defended the idea of a legal system based on a clear contract between inventors and society. The society had to protect the inventors' rights, but this protection had a heavy cost because of the immaterial nature of invention. In order to compensate the society, the inventor had to disclose his secret by providing an exact description of his invention, a sine qua non condition for effective protection. He also had to renounce his rights after a particular time span.
Another manifestation of this natural-right philosophy was the rejection of any preliminary examination by the administration. Whether conducted by scholars of the Académie des sciences or by members of corporations, such an examination was, in Boufflers' eyes, necessarily arbitrary because it established "a court judging for things that do not yet exist."
15 For him, the administration was unable to take a decision on the usefulness of new things, which could only be judged by public opinion. On January 7 th 1791, Boufflers' bill became the first Patent Act in France but it was immediately contested by those who considered patents were useless privileges. Thanks to a new strong lobbying effort, a second Patent Act, confirming the first one, was adopted and promulgated on May 25 th 1791. In order to draw a strict distinction from the old privileges, it called the patents "brevets d'invention" and set up a new patent administration.
The 1791 patents acts established three sorts of patents:
16 -Patents for invention, which protected "every discovery or new invention"; -Patents for improvement, which protected "every way to bring every kind of production to a new kind of perfection"; -Patents for importation (also known as patents of introduction), which protected "anyone who [would bring] first to France a foreign discovery".
In practice, hybrid categories were used and some patents were labelled as "for invention, improvement and importation". 17 This issue has some methodological implications. In our analysis, we have considered these "mixed" patents to be out of our samples in order to avoid any confusion.
Patents were granted for five, ten or 15 years. Although they were considered a human right, they were far from being accessible due to their very prohibitive cost. The patent tax was indeed very expensive: for five years it raised 300 francs, for ten years 800 francs, for 15 years 1,500 francs. 18 Even though only half of the cost had to be paid immediately when requesting the patentand the rest six months later -other taxes had to be added. Compared to the worker's average daily wage, this tax made the French patents inaccessible to many inventors. While patents were supposed to constitute a natural right, their cost was a real obstacle to such recognition. However, the rejection of any state intervention in the examination of applications was a real rupture with the previous practice.
Reform attempts (1791-1844)
The new French patent law was immediately subject to sharp criticism, which explains why some modifications were quickly introduced. An Act of September 20 th 1792 prevented the patenting of financial methods. 19 But more radical suggestions also appeared in order to undermine the compromise imposed in 1791. On 14 Pluviôse an VI (February 3 rd 1796), a report to the Conseil des Cinq-Cents suggested that patents should be issued only after a "mature consideration".
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This apparent challenge to the principle of nonpreliminary examination caused, in turn, such strong reactions that the project had to be abandoned. In 1811 the Conseil général des fabriques et des manufactures intended to reform the patent law but its work remained unsuccessful. In 1814, the issue was raised again, without further success.
Three years later, the same commission addressed the issue again, and again things were delayed until the Minister of Trade revived the project in 1826. 21 As patents were becoming more and more important, the Minister of Trade, the Comte de Saint-Cricq convened a commission in October 1828 to prepare a new || 18 The cost of patents was fixed in livres tournois, which became francs in 1795 with almost the same value. 19 Before this law, nearly fifteen patents were granted for the establishment of financial organizations such as savings banks or tontines. In the context of strong financial instability during the Revolution, these initiatives were considered dangerous and contrary to the spirit of patent laws. patent act. Because of the complexity of the problem, the commission undertook a wide consultation, the results of which reflected the different uses of patents. 22 Rare were those who, like the Société des arts et des sciences of Lille, called for the abolition of patents in favour of a system of rewards. Instead, most answers considered the patent the best way to give special rights to inventors. On many other points, however, opinions were much more divergent. The preliminary examination, claimed by the chambers of commerce of Boulogne, Montpellier and Tours, was rejected by those of Lyons, Marseille and Paris.
The reform of the patent legislation took a long time because political turmoil took precedence over economic discussions. Under the Monarchie de Juillet a new reform was planned once more: in 1832, the Minister of Trade reconvened the commission created in 1828 and added the famous chemist Gay-Lussac and two other members. A year later, the commission set up a report which was presented to the Conseil général de l'agriculture, du commerce et des manufactures only in 1837. Six more years were necessary to have a comprehensive reform although a partial change took place meanwhile: in 1838, an Act on the Justice of the Peace removed the examination of the validity of patents by simple magistrates in case of litigation and transferred the task to civil and criminal courts. Finally, a general bill on patents was presented to Parliament in 1843. More than a year of debates was still required before the new act was promulgated on July 5 th 1844. This new French patent law would govern the patent system until 1968.
The 1844 Patent Act: a new deal?
The 1844 Patent Act was adopted in a particular context. The late 1830s and early 1840s were a moment of industrial crisis in Europe. 23 In France, for instance, the linen industry was seriously challenged by British competitors. The development of railways was restrained by shortcomings of domestic metal supply. Some initiatives were taken to improve the situation. In 1839 and 1844, two national exhibitions of industrial products showed how the French industry was active. As a consequence of the crisis, protectionist movements arose. 24 Because of the final removal of export controls on British machines in 1843, the French ma- chine-making industry demanded new kinds of legal protection. The economic crisis set off an institutional change in order to protect French national industry.
The French patent reform echoed on such a context. Contrary to the 1791 acts, the 1844 Act did not include any preamble to define its philosophical principles. For some lawyers, patents could not be considered to be a property. 25 This weakening of the principle of invention's ownership was justified by the benefit of a contractual basis, already outlined by Boufflers but not in the same terms. This conception was not unanimously accepted and many people continued to defend another one based on natural right considerations. However, if the law no longer considered the inventors' right a property right, it continued to be based on the refusal to see the government delivering a privilege: the spirit of revolutionary law and its natural right foundations seemed at last to be preserved.
The main change consisted in a narrower definition of invention. Whereas the 1791 patent acts were vague on this issue, article 2 of the 1844 Act defined patentable "inventions or discoveries" by distinguishing three cases: the invention of new industrial products, the invention of new ways, the new application of known methods to produce a result or an industrial product. Thus, the new act did not consider the importance of the invention, which had only to meet two conditions: being new and having an industrial character. A method of cultivation or a method of reading were not considered industrial, and they could not, therefore, be patented. The law also provided criteria excluding purely theoretical discoveries. Besides, financial combinations and pharmaceutical products were removed from patentability.
One of the most important changes dealt with patents for importation and with the status of foreign patentees. Patents for importation had been subject to fierce criticism because they enabled people who were neither inventors nor industrialists to take out a patent only by importing an invention from foreign countries to France. The 1844 Act abolished patents for importation but authorized foreigners to take out patents in France under the same conditions as French citizens. In addition, it removed the provision of the 1791 Act, which enabled the invalidation of the patent of a person exporting his invention.
The new patent law also resulted from France's new position in international trade: France was no longer only an importer but also an exporter of industrial products. However, the 1844 patent reform aimed also to protect French industry. It provided that persons who first received their patent abroad may only obtain patents in France that would be valid until the end of their foreign one. the combination of the obligation to exploit French patents in France (known elsewhere as a working clause) and the prohibition to import from abroad objects patented in France both gave a protectionist character to the 1844 Act.
Another important issue concerned the cost of patents. The total cost of fiveand ten-year patents was increased, up to 500 and 1,000 francs respectively. But the new act allowed patentees to spread the payment of the tax over the entire duration of their patent. In practice, a patent costed 100 francs each year whereas workers' wages represented about 1.5 francs a day at mid-nineteenth century. Although workers on a modest wage could not yet have had real access to the patent system, the effective fall in price did enable artisans or small entrepreneurs to use it. Furthermore, the law created certificates for addition, which allowed the patentee to protect a minor improvement to the initial patent during its term (the patentee kept however the possibility to take another patent if he wanted to protect this improvement for a longer term). By decreasing the actual cost of a patent, the 1844 Patent Act promoted a democratization of patenting, which maintained the dynamics of the increase of the number of patents, which had actually started in the late 1830s.
However, despite this new development, the French patent system did not work better. Contemporaries complained about a proliferation of litigation due to the new system. In the first years of application under the 1844 Patent Act, the number of cases judged by the first instance courts increased, especially in the civil ones where it jumped from an average of two per year in the early 1840s to an average of 22 a decade later. 26 In 1854, the General Director of Agriculture and Commerce admitted that "under the new law, it has not seen a decline in the number of trials in which the patents give rise constantly, they have rather increased". 27 Of course, such a statement might have been qualified by taking into account the increasing number of patents but the patent system resulting from the 1844 reform was viewed as insecure. This situation was all the more sensitive as court decisions were often contradictory and then contested. In 1850, the Minister of Commerce had recognized the inconsistency of court decisions since "such a patent, valid in a jurisdiction court, is void in the neighbouring one; such an act is qualified as counterfeiting in Paris and elsewhere this same act escapes any repression."
28 Six years later, faced with these problems and limited powers of judges in technical matter, the industrialist and publisher Charles Laboulaye unsuccessfully demanded the introduction of "industrial consular courts" elected in the manner of commercial courts and charged with judging the trials relating to patents. 29 Another source of concern was the diffusion of technical knowledge, which was theoretically supposed to be counterpart to the patent. In the French patent system, access to the content of patents was even more essential as the application was under the sole responsibility of the inventor, who had to look for antecedent patents. On a pragmatic level, however, things were not so obvious. In fact, the revolutionary French patent laws had already provided for the publication of patents which had entered in the public domain. But only the decree of 17 vendémiaire VII (October 8 th 1798) really committed this task to the Conservatoire des arts et métiers. 30 Therefore, the expired patents were studied by pupils of the school of drawing and descriptive geometry established at the Conservatoire. 31 Clearly, this use of the patents was at the core of a technological discourse which emerged from the late eighteenth century. 32 The place of patents in the main technical literature from the early nineteenth century seems to confirm that central role.
Even though the publication of expired patents was clearly encouraged, concrete access to patents in force did not seem too convenient and the 1844 Patent Act did not really improve the situation. In fact, the government refused to effectively assume this task, which was essential for the proper functioning of the system. In 1859, Charles Laboulaye denounced the shortcomings of the publication of patents:
''At long intervals, two or three years after the time the patent could be issued, when the novelty that had been searched no longer exists, is published a large volume in-4° [read: quarto (G.G.B)], with a high price, containing a multitude of patents more or less truncated, without any order and all sorts of topics. Anyone interested in one or two questions, which might have some interest to see five or six patents, is careful not to lose valuable time leafing through these volumes, avoid buying them, and this costly publication is, in reality, done almost in vain". 33 Six years later, the Minister of Trade recognized "that the publication of patents could not be done with the desired speed, because of the lack of resources available to administration, [which] caused the delays". 34 Nonetheless, criticisms and proposals to the government remained unsuccessful. These shortcomings sounded like an admission of failure: the government was unable to make the patent system efficient, in spite -or because of -its liberal ideology, which prevented to it from developing an efficient patent administration.
New controversies
Far from placating the critics, the 1844 Patent Act fuelled a controversy, which appeared in the second half of 1840s and increased with the emergence of new patent laws in Europe. 35 In 1852, Britain expanded its patent legislation by reducing the burden of taxes, reinforcing patent publicity and establishing a sort of examination. 36 In 1854, the new Belgian law, which defined a patent period for twenty years and established inexpensive and progressive annuities, caused a strong debate in France and called to the fore one of its ardent figures, Ambroise Marcelin Jobard, director of the industrial museum of Brussels. Supporter of a perpetual property for the inventor, Jobard had since the mid-1840s been at the core of a powerful polemic against Joseph Garnier, the guardian of French liberal political economics' temple. Jobard's success, which was demonstrated by the adoption of the new Belgian law, encouraged more French lawyers to pronounce in favour of the patent's perpetuity.
In August 1854, an article of Journal des débats revived a major controversy which was illustrated by the disagreements among French liberal economists about the patent system. 37 Thus the main ancestor of liberal economists, JeanBaptiste Say, had supported patents because of their positive influence in the development of the English industry. For Say, patents were a legitimate reward for the inventor. 38 As Say's spiritual heir and as one of the founders of the French Association for Free Trade, Joseph Garnier took a similar position, without really settling the arguments that had emerged since Say's death. 39 Another liberal economic figure, Gustave de Molinari, adopted nevertheless a clearer position by advocating an inventor's right which would be guaranteed in its natural limits. 40 By contrast, the young Frederic Passy argued strongly against patents. 41 In short, on the issue of industrial property, the French liberal school was far from being unanimous and the divisions caused by this question were not confined to a clash between free trade and protectionism.
In fact, beyond these individual differences, there were such antinomies which manifested different conceptions of invention. Indeed, from similar values, such as a work-based conception of property or the freedom of trade and labour, free trade economists reached different conclusions. Considering the invention as the fruit of individual work was conducive to recognizing an inventor's property right. In this opinion, refusing such recognition violated the freedom to work and meant a sort of return to corporations. In this case, patents were not to be abolished. For others, invention was foremost collective (that was the idea put forward by Passy), each invention being more dependent on the social development than on individual efforts. But was not such a logic a way to socialism? In short, these economists were faced with the impossibility of establishing intellectual property rights firmly and did not succeed in giving definitive solution to the issues raised by the patent.
All these debates made a new reform of patent law necessary. In 1857, a project was discussed by the Conseil d'État but it was impossible to find unanimous consent. Therefore, after the international exhibition in 1862, the famous economist Michel Chevalier launched an offensive against the patent system: for him, invention was first of all collective and the appropriation of invention made no sense. 42 Consequently, the reform project was forgotten, but, even though it was sometimes threatened, the French patent system did not disappear.
In the introduction of his famous treatise on industrial property, the lawyer Eugène Pouillet added: "Delete patents, replace the same even by a system of rewards whatsoever, do you not see that the large manufacturer, being able once to enjoy the invention, will take it as quickly as possible, and playing his ordinary game, will crush his competitors? […] Where will be indeed the interest of these great lords to do better? They will be alone, and consumption willy-nilly be forced to take their products, since there will be no other. We will come back as a state of affairs even worse than the masters and guilds, and we will just have moved from an evil excess to another. Let those who call themselves democrats, who call themselves friends of the people, and at the same time calling for the abolition of patents, open their eyes. '' 43 Far from being a vestige of privilege, patent law in France was seen as a democratic promise.
A fragmented patent system
Analysis of the legal framework already shows that, far from being static, the French patent system evolved in the first half of the nineteenth century. A better understanding of its economic impact needs however to analyse how this legislation worked in practice. In this section, we look at the diffusion of patents in time and space and at the types of industries involved by using the INPI historical database, which provides a comprehensive set of data for the period from 1791 until the late nineteenth century. 44 In addition to the title of the patent, its dates (registration and issuance) and its requested duration, this data also includes the name of the patentees, their addresses and sometimes their occupation. Furthermore, the database covers details on the classification of the patent operated by the French Patent Office and the existence of a patent agent in the process of request. However, the sharp increase in the number of patents in the 1840s and the absence of a certain amount of information such as the first name makes its exploitation less easy for the period after 1844.
The adoption of the French patent acts in 1791 did not cause any upheaval in the delivering of patents although they constituted a turning point in the legal system. On the contrary, in a first instance, granted patents were as numerous as applications for privileges at the end of ancien régime. In the 1780s, 16 applications had been filed on average each year to the Comité du commerce. 45 Between 1791 and 1801, 15 patents were delivered on average each year (see Figure 1) . The number of patents continued to stagnate until the reign of Charles X (1824-1830), when it begun to rise rapidly. After the 1830 Revolution and LouisPhilippe's advent, this increase accelerated significantly before the 1844 reform. In fact, the 1838 Justice of the Peace Act and the 1839 industrial exhibition probably played a role in this process. Then, the 1844 Patent Act accelerated the dynamics. Between the early 1840s and the late 1850s, the number of granted patents was multiplied by three. Then, from the late 1850s until the 1870s, the number of granted patents remained stable, probably because the important controversies which challenged the patents laws in France and in Europe.
The origins of patentees
Another aspect is the geographical diffusion of patentees, which reveals a very high concentration in Paris (see Table 1 ). Such a phenomenon can be explained by the fact that Paris was one of the major French industrial areas but also because the control of any infringement was easier in this area. 46 Other reasons resulted rather from the patenting procedure itself, such as the presence of the patent office in Paris, which was the only place to consult the patents in force in order to find some antecedence. Furthermore, it was common for the provincial patentees to give the Parisian address of their patent agents. All this may explain the relative scarcity of patents in other industrial areas like northern France. 47 According to Jean-Pierre Hirsch, "not only the share of patents granted in this Mecca of the industrialization of the nineteenth century [did not reach] even 3 percent corresponding to the relative importance of its people" but the number of patents relating to the northern textile industry, a leading industry in this French department, was ridiculously low. Nevertheless, other departments in the provinces had a stronger presence of patentees than average: they were dominated by cities such as Lyons, Marseille, Bordeaux or Rouen.
The geography of the French patent system was not limited to France however. If we consider the patentee's origin, London had the second rank. Before 1839, 80 percent of the patents for importation, which represented about 10 percent of all patents granted from 1791 and 1839, were taken out by London citizens. The patents for importation were a way to enable British patentees or industrialists to expand by diffusing their technology in France thanks to a From a geographical point of view, the patent system was therefore particularly unbalanced. This imbalance stems from the centralization of patent administration, the role of capital in technology transfer and also the weight of different industries in the system.
Patenting and industries
Here again, the reality of the patent system was not uniform. The distribution of the number of patents by type of industry provides a better understanding of the role of the patent system (see Figure 2) . Even if this distribution depends on the classification made a posteriori by the French patent office, which has to be considered carefully, its analysis reveals several phenomena (see Table 2 ). First of all, throughout the period, three industries dominated this distribution: the textile, mechanical and chemical indus-tries. 48 All three were at the heart of the technical system of the first industrial revolution and were characterized by a relatively strong capital intensity. Then three other industries saw the development of patents until the 1830s: the building industry, the heating and lighting industry, two fields linked to urbanization and engineering. On the other hand, some sectors remained rather scarce such as the articles de Paris (fashion products), office materials but also the railway industry. Of course, this distribution was not static. From 1791 to the late 1830s, patents to the textile and chemical industries receded whereas other sectors became more present, especially the mechanical industry. Although it is difficult to make the connection from a statistical point of view, it seems that the patent system depended on investment cycles in these different spheres of activity. textile, mechanical and shipbuilding industries. On the other hand, agriculture, office materials or articles de Paris industry did not give rise to a lot of patents for importation. The French patent system thus seems to have been first used by rather capital-intensive industries at the heart of technological exchanges, especially in the case of Great Britain. The duration of patents also played a role in the heterogeneity of the French patent system. Because of cost considerations, it can be viewed as a clue of their importance from the patentee's point of view. Between 1791 and 1844, patents could be voided if the second part of the total amount of the tax had not been paid. More than 20 percent of patents belonged to that category (about 26 percent between 1831 and 1843). 49 Moreover, nearly half of the patents were granted for a 5-year term, probably because of their relatively lower cost. Although patents delivered for a ten-year term increased significantly in the 1820s, the duration remained almost stable. However, patents for importation were taken out for a longer time. Besides, the duration also depended on the type of industry. Patents were in fact shorter in industries where they were rare. Capital-intensive industries such as the railways, the mining or chemical industries were characterized by longer patents (see Figure 4) . Like its legal definition, the actual practice of the French patent system appeared to be full of tensions in the first half of the nineteenth century. Patents were primarily used by a small number of capital-intensive industries at the heart of the industrialization process. Their geographical distribution was fundamentally unequal and almost caricatured the contrast between Paris and the provinces. Finally, patents also differed in their duration, longer for those related to key industries and shorter for others. In fact, the French patent system appeared to be quite dual in nature. The question then is whether the 1844 reform unified it or, on the contrary, increased its fragmentation. 
The effects of the 1844 reform
The 1844 reform maintained a pre-existing dynamic but did not bring structural upheavals. Although a quantitative growth in the number of patents occurred, the geography of the system remained stable overall. The 1844 reform did not really change this order: the position of Paris became stronger although the weight of London receded a little (see Table 1 ). As for the distribution across industry, it was first characterized by a decline in the textile industry and an increase in patents in the engineering industry, with developments explained by cyclical circumstances. In 1850, the distribution by industry was fairly close to that of the late 1830s (see Table 4 ). Finally, the occupational distribution of patentees also remained fairly stable. Even if the number of patentees declaring themselves "mechanics" increased significantly after the 1844 reform, the weight of manufacturers and traders remained predominant (see Table 5 ). Source: INPI Historical Database. Note: The column "Foreign" reports the share of patents through importation for which the duration in France was dependent on the duration of the original patent granted by a foreign country.
The most notable change deals with the duration of patents. With the reform, the annual payment for patents allowed a 15-year patent and the choice each year of keeping it or not. Then, almost all patents were allocated a 15-year term but the effective duration became shorter. According to the Chamber of Commerce in Lille, the annual tax could be now afforded by inventors lacking wealth. 50 Only 55 percent of the patents granted in 1844 and 1845 were still in force after one year and only 16 percent had a duration of more than five years. 51 This phenomenon remained stable in the next decades and suggests that the 1844 reform first boosted short-life patents, which were likely to be "junk" ones. Such an assumption is confirmed by the evolution of another practice. The preliminary examination of patents had been rejected in 1791 to avoid any censorship of industry, which was reminiscent of the ancien régime way of granting of privileges. Nevertheless, as shown by Jean-Pierre Hirsch and Jérôme Baudry, an unofficial but very real examination had been set up and implemented by the Comité consultatif des Arts et des Manufactures. 52 The latter could give a posi- tive or negative opinion on the merits of patent applications, even though this opinion was not fully binding. It seems however that after the adoption of the new Patent Act in 1844, the Comité stopped playing such a role, except for particular cases. 53 From 1844, the patents were delivered without any governmental guarantee and even without any governmental serious regard. Only the civil or criminal courts, whose role had been reinforced six years sooner, had to judge the relevance of patents, whose quality before trial remained uncertain. The 1844 patent reform enabled a kind of democratization of patents by lowering their price and by respecting the principle of non-governmental commitment in their granting.
Conclusion
This brief description of the French patent system in the first half of the nineteenth century reveals all its contradictions. Originally, it was supposed to ensure recognition of the inventor's natural right by rejecting any preliminary examination that could recall the practices of the ancien régime. However, the prohibitive cost of patenting and the unofficial preliminary examination restricted access to the patent system. The French system was then used mainly by a small number of industries at the heart of the industrialization processtextiles, chemicals, engineering -and international trade. From a geographical point of view, it was dominated by Paris and concerned only a few provincial cities. It hardly fulfilled its function of disseminating technological information. The 1791 patent system seems dual in nature and rather fragile, but its capacity to resist abolition attempts, which appeared very early, shows not only that ideological aspects were far from secondary but also that it met the needs of institutions in French economic circles in that period.
The 1838 Justice of the Peace Act and the 1844 Patent Act restructured the system, which adapted to the economic context. Whereas the model derived from the 1791 acts was characterized by difficult access (high costs and unofficial examination), the new model strengthened the judicial regulation by entrusting it to more professional courts. Furthermore, it made access to the system easier by lowering the effective cost of patents and by much more rigorously applying the principle of prior non-examination. To a certain extent, this change came close to the 1791 ideal of the inventor's natural right, but it degraded the functioning of the system by reducing the life of patents -which can be a clue of their quality -and by not reducing the absolute amount of litigation. Furthermore, there was no real improvement in the disclosure of technological information. Paradoxically, the evolution of the system in a more democratic way made it more problematic.
In any case, the idea of structural continuity with the practices of the ancien régime does not stand up to analysis despite Tocqueville's invocation. In fact, the contradictions of the French patent system show how impossible it is to evaluate the economic performance of patenting by a simple explanation in terms of democratization of the invention or of social dynamics of the inventive activity. Equally important is the consistency of institutional choices with economic expectations. The French system has long suffered from the state's reluctance to provide sufficient tools to make patents efficient. The desire not to increase the role of the administration prevented the patent system from fulfilling its democratic promise.
